This November 2 Algorithms Seminar will be held from 1:00-2:00 pm. Please make a note of it, and plan to join us.
Information has become integral to decision making in this digital era. This gives rise to a timely and rapidly expanding line of research on information design, which studies how a more informed party can strategically influence downstream agents’ behaviors through selective provision of information. This talk will discuss a few recent advances on the algorithmics of information design, including the pricing of information (i.e., information design with transfers), information design in sequential decision making problems such as Pandora’s box, and the interplay of information design with contract design. Many of these problems are new and quite rich, thus multiple open problems along each line will also be discussed.
Haifeng Xu is an assistant professor in the Department of Computer Science and Data Science Institute at UChicago. He directs the Sigma Lab (Strategic IntelliGence for Machine Agents) which focuses on designing intelligent AI systems that can effectively learn and act in informationally complex multi-agent setups. His research has been recognized by a few awards including IJCAI early career spotlight, Google Faculty research award, the ACM SIGecom Dissertation Award and IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award.
LSRC D344 or join virtually via Zoom https://duke.zoom.us/j/92510717076